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IMPOSING IMPORT RESTRICTIONS UNDER ESCAPE
CLAUSE PROVISIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
The world automobile industry is now one of the largest, most
diverse industries involved in international trade.' Current trends
in the international motor vehicle trade have spawned much con-
troversy, especially in North America, the European Economic
Community (EEC) and Japan, concerning the imposition of import
restrictions.2 Escape clause or safeguards provisions, which can be
invoked under international and domestic law, provide methods
and procedures that allow nations to take emergency action on im-
portations of particular products. These provisions play an impor-
tant role in allowing domestic manufacturers to seek protection for
themselves from increased imports.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)3 con-
tains an escape clause provision in Article XIX.4 This Article per-
mits a signatory Nation, under international law, to withdraw from
concessions made under the Agreement if any product is being im-
ported in such increased quantities as to cause or threaten serious
injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive prod-
ucts.5 This provision has increasingly been ignored by major auto-
mobile importing Nations as an ineffective method of dealing with
1. In the United States alone, the industry operates approximately 300 manufacturing
plants and employs close to one million people. In Europe, in all its facets, the industry
employs more of Europe's population than any other commercial activity.
2. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-44 (Sept. 10, 1980),
PREHEARING REPORT TO THE COMMISSION AND PARTIES [hereinafter cited as PREHEARING
REPORT]. (Copy on file with the California Western International Law Journal.) The Euro-
pean Economic Community was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Its members
include Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands and United King-
dom. In addition, the EEC qualifies as a custom union under Article XXIV(8) of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
4. GATT, supra note 3, art. XIX.
5. A. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 27 (1979).
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the problem of increased imports. Nations, such as the United
States, rely on domestic import trade statutes6 which provide for
the use of certain types of restrictions not allowed under GATT.7
The United States and other importing Nations are also relying on
voluntary restraint agreements (VRA) which are legally outside
the auspices of GATT, but, which provide a more effective method
of dealing with the problem of increased imports. These measures,
however, raise the question of the usefullness of Article XIX as an
instrument of international law.
Rapid growth of the world automobile industry in the last
three decades has altered the patterns of international trade. Many
of the formerly protective markets of North America and Europe
have been opened to imports through successive reductions in tar-
iffs and by lower production costs in some exporting countries.9 A
high penetration of imports into the European and North American
automobile markets, threatening employment levels and sales of
domestically manufactured automobiles,10 has resulted in a resur-
gence of protectionism.I
This Comment reviews the current problem confronting the
automobile industry with regard to the imposition of import restric-
tions. It will examine the international legal basis for imposing im-
port restrictions, including Article XIX of GATT. The results of
the recently completed Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) 2
will be discussed with an emphasis on the proposed Safeguards
Code, 3 which still remains in draft form. It will then examine and
analyze the different types of restrictions that may be imposed, their
effect on international and domestic law and the metohds of insti-
tuting these restrictions. The responses of the major automobile
6. See, e.g., United States Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2102 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Trade Act].
7. There are exceptions such as when there is a balance of payments deficit under
Article XII of GATT. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at 26.
8. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at 197-254. (This contains an in-depth analysis of
VRAs, some of which will ultimately be discussed in this article.)
9. G. BLOOMFIELD, THE WORLD AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY (1978). This has resulted in
a wider choice of products for the motor vehicle buyer in what have become very concen-
trated markets.
10. Id. at 324.
11. Protectionism in the automobile industry refers to a movement of domestic forces,
such as labor unions and domestic manufacturers, who lobby in order to get the domestic
government to act on the matter of increased imports, which are affecting the local industry.
Id.
12. See infra note 59.
13. See infra note 60.
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importing Nations will also be discussed. The escape clause provi-
sion contained in Title II of the United States Trade Act of 19741
4
will be examined, including the procedures and effects of a Title II
action under the Trade Act. In order to fully understand the
problems that increased imports have caused in the international
automobile trade, a review of the problems facing the American
and European automobile industries is necessary.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTOMOBILE IMPORT PROBLEM
During the 1950's, the United States and Western Europe were
the centers of automobile manufacturing.'I At that time, both mar-
kets were well insulated from foreign competition. The American
automobile industry faced international competition from only the
most expensive brands imported from Europe and the subcompacts
which were not yet produced in the United States. 6 By the late
1970's, however, approximately 25 per cent of American automo-
bile sales were imports and nearly 50 per cent of Great Britain's
sales were imports.17 An important consequence of the changes in
the international market is increased competition in all of the do-
mestic markets, especially those of North America and Western
Europe. 8 These domestic automobile industries have also had to
adjust to government imposed regulations, domestic saturation, in-
vestment priorities and elimination, or at least a reduction of trade
barriers.'9 The world-wide oil crisis of the 1970's2O produced an
increased demand for smaller, more fuel efficient automobiles."'
This demand was felt most strongly in the United States, where the
automobile industry has been producing fuel inefficient
automobiles.22 In particular, the gasoline shortage of 1978 gener-
ated world-wide demand for - and consequently, purchases of -
14. Trade Act, supra note 6.
15. See WorldAuto Trade. Current Trends and Structural Problemr, Hearings before the
Subcomm on Trade o/the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as 1980 Trade Hearings]. (Copy on file with the California Western Interna-
tional Law Journal.)
16. Id. at 27. Japan had not yet produced cars that were competing internationally.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 28.
20. Oil embargoes in 1973 and 1978 resulted in less availability and higher prices of
gasoline for automobiles. Id. at 27.
21. 1980 Trade Hearings, supra note 15, at 36.
22. Id. at 1. Although the Europeans manufacture some fuel efficient automobiles, the
world-wide oil crisis, combined with the European automobile industry lagging behind the
Japanese technologically, and in the area of labor, has created a wider acceptance of the
3
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the more fuel efficient imported automobiles. 23 This dramatic rise
in demand for imports caused an equally sharp decline in the sales
of domestically manufactured automobiles in Europe and North
America. 24 This decline has provoked a confrontation among sev-
eral different factions, including automobile manufacturers, auto-
mobile dealers, labor unions, the governments of the European
Community, the United States and Japan, all of whom are involved
in international automobile trade.
The United States has long advocated an open policy with re-
spect to international automobile trade.25 The United States now
maintains perhaps the most open motor vehicle market in the
world.2 6 The current United States import tariff on automobiles is
the second lowest duty rate on automobiles in the developed
world. 27 Nevertheless, the American automobile industry has ex-
perienced some of the lowest sales and employment levels in its
history.28 As a result of the market and economic conditions, the
automobile industries of the United States and Western Europe are
facing a serious problem caused by increased imports of
automobiles manufactured in Japan. The Japanese imports have
been penetrating the markets of Europe and the United States at an
alarming rate and are expected to increase unless the domestic
manufacturers can produce more competitive vehicles in the near
future. It appears that the protectionist forces of the importing Na-
tions cannot prolong their desire for more drastic action aimed at
reducing the number of imports. These protectionist forces in the
United States have been concerned with the imposition of unilat-
Japanese automobile in the European Community. see EUROPE, Nov.-Dec., 1980, at 24
[hereinafter cited as EUROPE].
23. NATURAL RESOURCES & COMMERCE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE:
STAFF WORKING PAPER, CURRENT PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED STATES AUTOMOBILE INDUS-
TRY AND POLICIES TO ADDRESS THEM (July 1980) [hereinafter cited as STAFF WORKING
PAPER]. (Copy on file with the California Western International Law Journal.) Demand for
fuel efficient automobiles averaged about 43 per cent of the U.S. market from 1970-1978.
This percentage rose to 56 per cent in 1979 and to well over 60 per cent in 1980. Id. at 11.
24. Id. at 2. In 1974, after the oil crisis of 1973, retail sales of new passenger cars in the
United States dropped from a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 11.439 million to 8.876
million. In 1979, after the oil crisis of 1978, retail sales dropped from 11.312 million to
10.669 million, and sales have further declined to a seasonally adjusted rate of below eight
million in the second quarter of 1980. Id.
25. PREHEARING REPORT, SUpra note 2, at A-19.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Japanese import market is fully open. There are no tariffs or quotas. In
actuality, Japan is the only nation that actively facilitates the import of passenger cars. See
L. A. Times, Sept. 24, 1980, at 2, col. 2.
28. STAFF WORKING PAPER, supra note 23, at vii.
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eral restrictions by means of legislative action.29 The decision of
whether or not to impose unilateral restrictions must be determined
by examining the problems currently facing the automobile
industry.
II. CURRENT STATUS OF THE IMPORT PROBLEM
An underlying reason for the predicament faced by the Ameri-
can and European automobile industries is domestic manufac-
turer's past inabilities to compete against a considerably larger fleet
of imported cars offering better gas mileage and a more favorable
image of quality.30 As a result, foreign manufacturers such as Ja-
pan's Nissan (Datsun) and Toyota have been able to attract an in-
creasing proportion of the world market, capturing a record share
of the American market in the first part of 1980. 3 1 In 1978, imports
accounted for 17.7 per cent of new car sales in the United States; in
June of 1980, that figure had risen to 29.2 per cent.32 In the first half
of 1980 exports from Japan to the EEC accounted for a 24.6 per
cent, increase, including a 43.3 per cent rise in Germany and a 14.6
per cent increase in Great Britain.
33
The import-induced injury to the American and European in-
dustries has been caused almost entirely by Japanese automobile
manufacturers.34 Although the new fuel efficient American cars
have become more competitive in the last year,35 the Japanese have
so saturated the domestic markets that sales of domestically manu-
factured cars are still on the decline. The problem facing American
automobile manufacturers is not unique. Such international manu-
facturers as Volkswagon and Fiat, as well as others in the devel-
oped world, have felt the impact of increased demand for Japanese
imports.36 The automobile manufacturers of North America and
Europe must find suitable methods to cope with the problem of
increased imports.
29. NAT'L L.J., Mar. 23, 1981, at 26, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as LAW JOURNAL].
30. STAFF WORKING PAPER, supra note 23, at vii.
31. Id. at 12.
32. Id.
33. EUROPE, supra note 22, at 24.
34. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. NO. I 110, CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES AND
CERTAIN CHASSIS AND BODIES THEREFOR: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION
No. TA-201-44 (1980)[hereinafter cited as CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES]. Japanese share of
the U.S. automobile market rose from around II per cent in 1975-1977, to 15.6 per cent in
1979, to 21.4 per cent for the first six months of 1980.
35. L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1980, at 11, col. 2.
36. EUROPE, supra note 22, at 25.
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The imposition of any type of import relief measure must have
some legal basis, whether it be international or domestic. The most
viable international legal method is the escape clause37 or safe-
guard provision found in Article XIX of GATT.31 This provision
allows a domestic industry to seek some type of temporary relief
under international law.39
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL BASIS FOR IMPOSING IMPORT
RESTRICTIONS
The rapid growth and diversity of international trade has
prompted the nations of the world to increasingly rely on GATT as
a source of international rules on trade.' GATT is binding only
on the signatory Nations, yet it has been looked upon as a symbol
for governing international trade law among all trading Nations of
the world.4
A. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GATT furnishes a code of conduct for international commer-
cial relations. The principle rules include a prohibition against dis-
crimination among member Nations, protection through tariff
action, and negotiable tariff rates.42 The Agreement is a multilat-
eral Treaty embodying reciprocal rights and obligations.
4 3
GATT, at the time of its origin, was never intended to play the
role it has been forced to play in international trade." It was origi-
37. An escape clause in the context of an international trade agreement (e.g., GATT) is
a provision which allows the participating nations to detract from the obligations they incur
under the agreement.
38. GATr, supra note 2, art. XIX
39. Id.
40. J. KOLASA, LAW-MAKING AND LAW ENFORCING FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE GATT EXPERIENCE. (World Order Studies Program Occa-
sional Paper No. 3 Center of International Studies Princeton University, 1976.)
41. Id. ISSUES: Before the 35th General Assembly of the United Nations. United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has been competing with
GATT as a forum for rule-making in the international trading system. Id. at 82-83.
42. F. V. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY (1978). See LORTIE, INTEGRATION
& THE LAW OF GATT (1975).
43. 1977 U.N.Y.B. at 1172. The U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment drew up a
charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1947-1948, and established an
Interim Commission for the organization (ICITO). Id.
44. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 96th CONG., 1st SESS., MTN & THE LEGAL INSTITU-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1979). See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 73RD ANNUAL MEETING: MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND THE
MTN RESULTS [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN SOCIETY].
Vol. 12
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nally conceived as a reciprocal tariff reduction agreement, but
eventually evolved into the central international institution for
trade.45 GATT has become the only viable international vehicle
for assisting nations in conflicts concerning international trade pol-
icy. 6 Recently, a number of GATT's constitutional infirmities
have begun to emerge. International economic interdependence,
the quadrupling of GATT membership to include countries with
greatly divergent stages and theories of economies, the crisis of un-
employment and energy have all buffetted GATT and international
economics.47
The law of GATT has been characterized as "soft law,"' 48 not
by reason of the vagueness of the formulation of GATT, but owing
to numerous exceptions and various procedures that may, under
certain circumstances, be invoked to soften, suspend or withdraw
obligations that are too rigid.49. With increasing dependency on
international trade, nations have consistently ignored the specific
rules and procedures of GATT.5 0 Article XIX of GATT is a prime
example, since it provides safeguards which allow any member na-
tion, under special conditions, to suspend, modify or withdraw its
obligations with respect to an imported product.51
1. Article XIX of GATT. The most typical and well-known
escape clause provision is Article XIX of GATT. This provision
allows a member nation to escape from concessions made under
GATT which may result in increased imports and, consequently, in
serious injury to a particular domestic industry. 2 The rationale for
including such clauses in international agreements is that these
45. AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 44, at 58.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. J. KOLASA, supra note 40, at 31.
49. Id
50. See Comment, GAIT and the Tokyo Round- Legal Implications of the New Trade
Agreement, 11 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 302 (1981) [hereinafter cited as GAT and the Tokyo
Round]. The reasons for the disregard of GATT obligations include the failure of the agree-
ment to rectify the status of developing nations, its failure to deal with non-tariff barriers as a
more effective measure to deal with increased imports, prevention of more liberal trade be-
cause of strict guidelines and procedures in GATT, and the present situations of import
competition and balance of payment deficits which have forced nations to impose import
restrictions regardless of GATT prohibitions.
51. J. KOLASA, supra note 40, at 34. Nations invoking escape clause provisions or the
various softening procedures are Bequired to seek consultation with all the countries con-
cerned and with GATT members. In most cases, some form of compensation must be nego-
tiated. Id.
52. Easton, Administration of Import Statutes. Possibilities for Harmonizing the Investi-
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clauses are an attempt to relax international trade barriers.5 3 As
these barriers are lowered, domestic industry and its workers may
face serious injury, dislocation and, at times, extinction.54 The es-
cape clause provides a form of temporary relief to the threatened
domestic industry by allowing imposition of import restrictions,
thus giving the industry time to adjust to international competi-
tion.55 Escape clauses provide temporary relief to domestic indus-
tries unable to cope with increased foreign competition.56 The
escape clause should not, however, be automatically invoked upon
a sharp increase in imports.57 A decline in an international com-
petitive position can result from several causes, including inflation,
inefficiency in the domestic industry, and poor long-term
planning.58
It must be emphasized that GATT obligations have increas-
ingly been ignored. As a result, nations have imposed quantitative
restrictions and enacted domestic content laws in apparent viola-
tion of GATT rules. Provisions in GATT were made, however, for
a continuous series of negotiations that allow amendment to GATT
or at a minimum allow for trade negotiations among the con-
tracting parties.
B. Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Tokyo Round5 9
With the completion of GATT in the late 1940's, many nations
of the world adopted a trade agreement act. These acts marked the
beginning of a commitment to freer trade. Since that time, coun-
tries have worked hard to strengthen an open world trading system
on a multilateral basis. This multilateral trading system, although
strengthened over the years, is now under enormous pressure be-
cause of recent developments in the world economy. The world
economic situation has reached a point where governments are be-
ing urged by domestic constituencies to resort to protectionism to
gative Techniques and Standards of the International Trade Commission, 10 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 65, 66 (1980).
53. Id.
54. [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7263 [hereinafter cited as 1974 NEWS].
55. Id.
56. See F. McFADZFAN, TOWARDS AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY (1972).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 16.
59. For a more in depth analysis and review of the MTN: Tokyo Round, see generally
G4 77 and the Tokyo Round, supra, note 50; Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, 9 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 153-75 (1979).
Vol. 12
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protect sectors in which imports are only a symptom and not a
cause of economic distress.
The substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade
has been the objective of a series of negotiations or "rounds" held
within the framework of GATT. The latest round was launched in
Tokyo, Japan in September of 1973.60 Upon its completion in
1979, GATT members had hoped to review the basic trading rules
of GATT. The Tokyo Round, which was the culmination of this
series of rounds, examined the possibility of revising the multilat-
eral safeguard system and in particular Article XIX of GATT.
61
One proposed revision was the Safeguards Code.
1. Proposed Safeguards Code.62 There has been much ambigu-
ity as to what types of situations and protective measures legiti-
mately qualify for safeguard action. The objective of the Tokyo
Round, with respect to the Safeguards Code, was to arrive at a
common set of procedures considered internationally acceptable
for the implementation of safeguards.63
The British-North American Committee' issued a policy
statement during the latter part of the Tokyo Round that called for
a new and clear code of conduct to cover the use of temporary safe-
guard measures to minimize disruption and to facilitate adjust-
ments in industries that are being severely affected by imports.6 5
The Committee claims that the safeguard measures would be useful
instruments for orderly adoption of economic change.66
In many cases, when a country has taken action under GATT,
the required procedures67 have not been followed.68 Many coun-
60. 1977 U.N.Y.B., supra note 43, at 1172.
61. Id. Article XIX specifies the circumstances in which member nations could take
immediate action of a nondiscriminatory character to restrict imports of particular products
when these products caused or threatened serious injury to domestic producers of a like or
directly competitive product.
62. See generally GA 77 and ihe Tokyo Round, supra note 50, at 218-21.
63. W. CLINE, N. KAWANABE, T.O.M. KRONSJO, & T. WILLIAMS, TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS IN THE TOKYO ROUND, A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT (1978) [hereinafter cited as
CLINE & KAWANABE].
64. An organization sponsored by the British-North American Research Association
(U.K.), the National Planning Association (U.S.A.) and C.D. Howe Research Institute
(Canada).
65. THE BRITISH-NORTH AMERICAN COMMITTEE, A POLICY STATEMENT (May 1978)
[hereinafter cited as POLICY STATEMENT].
66. Id. at vi.
67. GATT requires that the country taking action to prove injury and to consult with
other affected countries.
9
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tries have restricted imports without invoking Article XIX.69 In
certain EEC countries, the government has permitted private indus-
try to negotiate voluntary export restraint agreements with counter-
part industries in Japan."' The proposed Safeguards Code requires
certain procedures for public hearings and examinations of the evi-
dence when a safeguard measure is comtemplated.71
The purpose for introducing the new Safeguards Code is to
bring within the framework of GATT the increasing number and
variety of safeguard devices that have already been instituted by
various nations.72 The contracting parties could then improve on
these safeguard measures and thus provide a more internationally
acceptable set of procedures. 73 As a matter of policy, a variety of
measures have been advanced in an effort to cope with the mount-
ing influx of imports.
IV. IMPORT RESTRAINTS AVAILABLE TO NATIONS INVOLVED IN
THE AUTOMOBILE TRADE
The tariff has been the traditional method of limiting imports.
GATT specifically provides for the use of a tariff as a means of
protecting domestic industry.
4. Tariff Barriers
A tariff is a "list or schedule of articles on which a duty is
imposed upon their importation..." into a country. The tariff in-
cludes the rates at which the articles are taxed and the custom or
duty payable on the articles.74 Since the signing of GATT in 1947,
the GATT contracting parties have concentrated almost exclusively
upon the reciprocal lowering of tariff barriers." Tariffs, however,
have become less effective and important obstacles to trade than
have "non-tariff" barriers which are not adequately covered by the
present GATT rules.7 6
The United States imposes a tariff on imported cars of 2.9 per





72. S. GOLT, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS 1973-1979: THE CLOSING STAGE (1978).
73. Id.
74. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1682 (4th ed. 1968).
75. Graham, supra note 59, at 161.
76. Id. at 156.
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cent; in contrast, tariffs instituted by the Common Market Coun-
tries of Europe are 14 per cent.77 In addition, automobiles being
imported into the United States are competing with domestically
manufactured models that have been assessed taxes of approxi-
mately 29 per cent.7" Under the guidelines of GATT, the negotiat-
ing parties entered into an agreement on January 1, 1980, and began
a new series of tariff reductions, averaging 33 per cent.7 9
Remarkable success in reducing import tariffs has been
achieved in the face of a new wave of protectionism. Although the
tariff increases that have occurred have been minor, recent trade
restrictions have taken the form of export restraints, international
investment restrictions and non-tariff barriers, none of which are
effectively covered by GATT.80 In recent years, the most common
response to protectionist pressure has been to impose formal or in-
formal quotas, 8' by means of executive agreements, rather than
tariff increases mandated by domestic legislatures.8 2
The continued increase in foreign imports, however, has forced
several European nations to impose restrictions on imports.8 3 Dif-
ferent types of restrictions are used to solve the various problems
facing the domestic industry. Several nations involved in interna-
tional automobile trade have proposed limits on competition. 4
France and Italy,8 5 for example, have stringent import restrictions
that have prevented the Japanese from capturing more than three
per cent of the local markets.86 Hardest hit by the Japanese imports
are those countries that do not have an agreement with Japan to
limit imports.87 These agreements could decrease unemployment
77. AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Aug. 4, 1980, at 10. This tariff of 14 per cent only applies to
automobiles imported from outside the Common Market.
78. Id.
79. Graham, supra note 59, at 156.
80. 1980 Trade Hearings, supra note 15, at 39.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. TIME, Jan. 12, 1981, at 65.
84. STAFF WORKING PAPER, supra note 23, at 50.
85. AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Aug. 18, 1980, at 19. In 1961, Japan and Italy entered into a
treaty which set mutual limits on trading in automobiles. Id.
86. TIME, supra note 83.
87. Id. In Sweden, for example, the Japanese have increased their market share from
one per cent in 1980 to 14 per cent at present. Id. at 19. In other European countries, the
Japanese penetration has been climbing toward 10 per cent in West Germany, 13 per cent in
Great Britain, and 30 per cent in the Netherlands. See AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, supra note 85, at
65.
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and increase sales of domestically manufactured automobiles.88
Importing nations increasingly rely on quantitative restraints (e.g.,
quotas) as a method of dealing with the import problem as they
have become effective tools in limiting imports.
B. Non-Tarff Barriers in the Form of Quantitative Restraints
1. Quotas. A quota is a method by which imports can be lim-
ited by reducing the number of imports or reducing the number of
imports in proportionate shares to numbers allowed in past years.
The imposition of import quotas would have two positive and im-
mediate results: a decrease in unemployment in the domestic auto-
mobile industry and an increase in the number of automobiles
domestically produced.89
Reducing the number of imported automobiles, and thus for-
eign competition, by imposing import quotas would also have sev-
eral major drawbacks.9" It would force consumers to purchase a
domestically manufactured car, to purchase no car at all, or to pay
inflated prices for hard to get imports.9 Reduced foreign competi-
tion would result in inflated prices for American automobiles since
domestic manufacturers would take advantage of reduced competi-
tion to raise their prices.92 In addition the lack of competition
would cause a delay in the methods of modification which domestic
manufacturers must institute in order to remain competitive in the
international automobile market.
9 3
Restricting international competition would create an increase
in domestic automobile prices and retard the development of a
more fuel efficient automobile.9 4 The United States Government
has estimated that restricting imports by 500,000 cars a year would
result in a $700 per car increase on the price of imports.9 5 If United
States' manufacturers respond with an average $500 increase, the
long-term domestic sales would be about 230,000 cars a year which
88. STAFF WORKING PAPER, supra note 23, at 50.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. If imports are limited, they would be less available and therefore much more
difficult to purchase.
92. Id. When imported goods are restricted quantitatively, their prices rise in response
to the limitation of supply. As a result, prices on comparable domestic products rise in re-
sponse to the easing of competition. See L.A. Times, Sept. 24, 1980, § 2, at 2, col. 1.
93. Id.
94. AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Sept. 1, 1980, at 38.
95. STAFF WORKING PAPER, supra note 23, at 50.
Vol. 12
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is less than normal.96 The imposition of quotas directed at the Jap-
anese automobile manufacturers is being contemplated by several
Nations, including West Germany and the United States. 97 If im-
port quotas are aimed exclusively at one Nation, however, there is
still the possibility of a surge in imports from somewhere else.9s
One of the most debated and effective means of instituting quotas is
the orderly marketing agreement. Although it has not been insti-
tuted by the United States Government, there is a strong likelihood
that the President may eventually negotiate with the Japanese con-
cerning the automobile import problem. The most widely used
method of restricting imports in the world today is domestic con-
tent regulation. This type of regulation is a swift and effective
measure that can be instituted by domestic legislatures.
2. Domestic Content Laws. Domestic content regulation usu-
ally requires that a certain percentage of the value of a domestically
manufactured automobile be produced in that country.99 The im-
position of domestic content requirements improves automotive in-
vestment and creates more jobs in the nation in which they are
imposed. Imposing content legislation has a substantial impact on
international trade policy and could lead to retaliatory measures by
affected countries. These measures could affect any gain in em-
ployment by a decrease in employment in non-automobile related
industries subject to such retaliatory measures'0° Presently, such
countries as Spain, Mexico and Australia' require a high percent-
age of domestically produced content in each vehicle sold. 1
0 2
Although domestic content legislation is impressive at first
96. Id. This would result in a higher cost of domestically built cars and thus increase
the chance that fewer cars will be purchased. Id.
97. Id. Several bills before the U.S. Congress are striving for imposition of quotas. H.
R. 1954 would limit Japanese imports to 1.2 million units for the next three years and would
add 5 per cent to that total for the following two years. H. R. 1999 would establish an overall
import limit for three years of 1.7 million, with presidential authority to waive the quota. H.
R. 2049 would limit foreign auto imports to 10 per cent of the domestic market for three
years. H.R. 6492 (Mottl Bill) would limit imports of automobiles to 10 per cent of domestic
consumption. This quota would run for five years and would be allocated by supplying
country on basis of previous market shares. 1980 Trade Hearings, supra note 15, at 124.
98. Id.
99. See AUTOMOTIVE NEws, Sept. 22, 1980, at 2.
100. Id. Retaliation measures taken by the exporting nation may affect products manu-
factured by other industries, thus employment levels will also be affected. Id. at 17.
101. Id. At the present time, 31 countries impose some form of content requirements.
102. Id.
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glance, it can often be detrimental.' 013 As mentioned above, domes-
tic content regulation could increase automotive investment and
employment levels, however, by restricting international competi-
tion, the regulations could result in increased domestic automobile
prices, slow-down the transformation of the industry and retard the
development of more fuel efficient vehicles."° The basic problems
of the automobile industry may also be a result of tax and tariff
inequities which give imports an unfair competitive advantage. 05
3. Taxes. International trade agreements, such as the Treaty
of Rome,1"6 allow nations to assess indirect taxes such as sales, ex-
cise or value-added taxes on imports'017 despite the GATT prohibi-
tion concerning the discrimination of imports through
manipulative use of internal taxation systems. 10 8 These Nations are
also allowed to rebate taxes at the time of exportation of the prod-
uct.'°9 All industrialized Nations, except for the United States, im-
pose a border tax on imports."10 In Japan, there is a 15 per cent
commodity tax on small cars and a 20 per cent commodity tax on
large cars."' In recent years one of the most effective methods of
negotiating on import problems has been the orderly marketing
agreement.
4. Orderly Marketing Agreements. An orderly marketing
agreement (OMA) is an arrangement between nations to limit ex-
ports of certain articles among the parties so as to avoid injuring
domestic producers in the countries of one or more of the parties. " I2
According to the terms of the agreement, one country agrees to
limit its exports of a particular article to a certain level during the
103. AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Sept. 1, 1980, at 238.
104. Id.
105. AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, supra note 77, at 10.
106. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force, Jan. 1, 1958) (unofficial English translation). See dePass,
Value Added Tax. The Concept and Current Progress Towards Harmonization in the Euro-
pean Economic Community, 9 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 5 (1979).
107. See dePass, supra note 106.
108. Id.
109. Id. This is allowed so that the tax levied by the importing country is the only tax
that the goods bear. Thus, in theory, both the domestic and foreign goods receive equal tax
treatment. Id.
110. AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, supra note 77, at 10.
111. L.A. Times, Sept. 24, 1980, § 2, at 2, col. 2.
112. See Leonard and Foster, The Metamorphisis of the U.S. International Trade Com-
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period of the agreement." m3 The other country would then agree to
limit imports of the subject article to the same amount.1 4 The key
element of the OMA is the quota; however, there may be special
provisions for the regulation of exports and for review of and
changes in the quota under certain circumstances. 15
An exporting nation would most likely favor negotiating an
OMA as opposed to having import restrictions imposed unilaterally
against it. The OMA quota may be less restrictive due to the spe-
cial conditions of the OMA. Although an OMA quota would most
likely be outside the guidelines of GATT," 6 the exporting Nation
may also prefer an OMA because other GATT members, who may
have their own problems with the exporting Nation, would be un-
sympathetic to a request for GATT action and therefore would be
better off under an OMA.
117
An OMA did not become identified as such until the Trade
Act of 1974, in which section 203 of the Act authorized the Presi-
dent to "negotiate orderly marketing agreements" after receiving a
report from the International Trade Commission (ITC) containing
an affirmative finding that increased imports were causing injury to
a domestic industry." 8 The principal underlying an OMA, how-
ever, is implied in Article XIX of GATT." 9 This provision has
been interpreted by the Trade Act as to permit the United States
Government to use OMA's to escape the legal consequences of vio-
lating GATT's prohibition against quotas.120 Quotas are illegal
under GATT, except under certain circumstances not covered by
the kind of sweeping protection currently pending in Congress.' 2'
In effect, the President is now able to negotiate voluntary interna-
tional agreements which have the effect of limiting imports without
violating international law and resorting to the unilateral imposi-
113. U.S. International Trade Commission Memorandum, submitted by General Coun-
sel (Oct. 23, 1980). (Copy on file with the California Western International Law Journal.)
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. Orderly marketing arrangements, however, have been devised to deal with
"market disruption" under GATT although neither term appears in GATT. See Adams and
Dirlom, Import Competition and the Trade Act of1974: A Case Study of Section 201 and its
Interpretation by the International Trade Commission, 52 IND. J. 570 (1976-1977).
117. Id.
118. 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976).
119. GATT, supra note 3, art. XIX.
120. Id.
121. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 5.
15
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tion of import quotas. 122 More recently Japan has voluntarily lim-
ited the number of automobiles exported to the United States under
a device known as a voluntary restraint agreement (VRA).
123
5. Voluntary Restraint Agreement. The basic philosophy be-
hind a VRA is the promotion of freer trade. A tariff or quota sys-
tem limits the free flow of the economic system. A VRA is basically
a series of nonlegal voluntary negotiations which enable foreign ex-
porters to avoid strict government quotas.
124
Self-restraint by the Japanese, under the guidelines of the
VRA, appears more favorable than other types of non-tariff meas-
ures since it would be less of a precedent for other non-escape
clause methods used to escape from free trade commitments.
25
The VRA avoids the retaliatory measures that legislation, such as
imposing unilateral import quotas, in breach of that the United
States' obligations would allow.126 The purpose of the recently in-
stitued Japanese VRA was "to maintain the free trading system and
assist in the development of the American economy."' 127 The gen-
eral policy responses of the importing Nations play an important
role in the lingering effect of escape clause provisions under GATT,
as they are the new focus on the import problem which have not
been effectively dealt with under international law.
B. Domestic Policy Responses by Importing Nations
The Nations most affected by increased imports from Japan
have been the United States and several countries in Western Eu-
rope. In 1973, the American automobile manufacturers responded
to an influx of imports by implementing a world-wide car strategy
involving investments on an international scale.' 28 These invest-
ments were intended to be used to assemble components in differ-
ent factories around the world by taking advantage of the benefits
of each individual location.' 29
The response by American manufacturers also centered
122. J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 688
(1977).
123. L.A. Times, May 2, 1981, at 1, col. 5. Japanese agreed to cut exports by 7.7 per cent
or nearly 140,000 automobiles as part of a two-year program. Id.
124. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at 197-254.
125. LAW JOURNAL, 5upra note 29.
126. Id.
127. L.A. Times, supra note 123, at 6, col. 1.
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around shifting from the production of large models to the smaller,
more efficient models. Shifting to another product within the same
industry is not ordinarily or necessarily injurious to that indus-
try.' 30 The automobile industry is unique, however, because of the
amount of time (lead-time)"' associated with introducing new
models and the large amount of capital investments required.
32
Industry estimates of the need to alter production between 1975
and 1980 were not accurate in predicting the change in demand.1
33
Due to the lead-time problem and unforeseen events such as the
Iranian revolution and subsequent oil shortages, the American
manufacturers' plans for producing and expanding small car output
lagged behind the market and its needs.' 34 This problem resulted
in an investigation by the United States ITC under the guidelines
of the United States Trade Act of 1974.135
1. United States International Trade Commission Investigation.
The ITC is an independent governmental agency engaged in
factfinding and analysis in relation to international trade.1 36 The
ITC is not under the control of the United States Congress nor the
President, but is responsible to both for reporting its findings on
international trade. 3' The Commission also administers certain
United States foreign trade laws.'
38
The current status of the international automobile industry
called for a response by the ITC to the problems occasioned by
increased imports. With the passage of the Trade Act of 1974, the
ITC has been increasingly relied upon as an instrument for han-
dling problems in the area of international trade.' 39 This reliance
has resulted from newer industrialized Nations of the world becom-
ing more industrially efficient and, therefore, more competitive in
the world economic market. 14
In response to the increasing numbers of automobiles im-
130. CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES, 5umpra note 34, at 30.
131. Id. A shift in the auto industry must be anticipated at least three to five years in




135. Trade Act, supra note 6.




140. Id. at 271.
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ported into the United States, on June 12, 1980141 the United Auto
Workers (UAW) 14 2 filed a petition with the ITC for import relief
pursuant to section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.'43 The Ford Mo-
tor Company took similar action on August 4, 1980. l'" These peti-
tions were filed for the purpose of securing some type of temporary
relief for the ailing United States automobile industry. 45  The
ITC, in November, 1980, rejected the petition from imports of cars
built in Japan. l" The Commission determined that "on-the-high-
way passenger automobiles .. .are not being imported into the
United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial
cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic indus-
tries producing articles like or directly competitive with the im-
ported articles."' 47 The Commission's investigation indicated that
the decline in demand for new automobiles was not substantially
due to increased imports but to the general recessionary conditions
in the American economy.'
48
The increase in the number of Japanese automobile exports to
Europe has caused a growing sensitivity to the problem in the
EEC. 49 The ITC recognized that predictions about what types of
restrictions the EEC might apply and whether exports might be di-
verted to the United States were too speculative in helping the
Commission come to a determination.150 Most likely, the response
by the European Nations would be affected by the developments in
141. PREHEARING REPORT, supra note 2, at A-I.
142. International Union, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America.
143. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1). The UAW asked for five year temporary relief and for
higher tariffs on imported cars from the current 2.9 per cent to 20 per cent. In addition, they
asked for quotas to be set at the 1975-1976 import levels. See AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Sept. 29,
1980, at 6.
144. PREHEARING REPORT, supra note 2, at A-2. The Ford petition paralleled but did
not duplicate the UAW petition. Ford desired a system of minimum annual quotas to help
foreign manufacturers locating in the United States. General Motors has advocated volun-
tary self-restraint for the Japanese and Volkswagon of America has remained neutral in that
they are an importer and a member of the domestic industry. See AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Sept.
29, 1980, at 6.
145. Id. The remedy recommended by the I.T.C. should be designed with the goal of
helping United States auto producers generate the financial resources and provide the oppor-
tunity needed to proceed with their investment plans.
146. Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1980, at 9, col. 1.
147. CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES, supra note 34, at 1.
148. Id. at 21.
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the United States, especially the determination of the ITC.' 5 ' For
example, as a result of the Commission's determination, some
members of the EEC have recently held negotiations with Japanese
automobile manufacturers.
52
2. Response of the European Community. In Europe, the auto-
mobile industry realized after 1973 that it must rationalize and re-
group. 153 The Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy
have allowed their manufacturers to enter into self-restricting
agreements, 54 or what have been termed as "de facto, non-govern-
mental" restraints, with the Japanese. 55 As recently as January of
1981, the Japanese government announced that it would request
that Japanese automobile manufacturers hold exports to West Ger-
many, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg to only moderate
increases in 1981.156 The United States, despite continuous de-
mands upon Japan to control automobile exports, has been unsuc-
cessful in coming to any agreement with the Japanese.
157
The Commission of the European Communities has come
under great pressure to restrict Japanese imports. 58 The Commis-
sion has admitted that its policy toward the Japanese imports needs
to be revised and has recognized that a system must be instituted
that will harmonize national voluntary restraint negotiations. 159
Once the European Community harmonizes its voluntary restraint
arrangements, it could then extract some concessions from the Jap-
anese by use of the community's joint bargaining power. l6
With the increased usage of domestically imposed methods of
limiting imports, comes the legislative means to institute these re-
strictions. It appears, as mentioned above, that the current status of
international trade has bypassed the usefuflness of certain GATT
provisions. The United States has been the initiator, among devel-
151. Id.
152. L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1981, § 4, at 2, col. 1.
153. EUROPE, supra note 22, at 25.
154. Id. The markets of Great Britain, France and Italy had been traditionally open to
imports.
155. L.A. Times, supra note 152.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. EUROPE, supra note 22, at 26. In July of 1980, the Committee of Common Market
Car Manufacturers wrote a public letter to the Commission pointing out the rapid increase in
imports. Id. at 26-27.
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oped Nations, with regard to the creation of domestic import trade
statutes.
V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DOMESTIC IMPORT TRADE
STATUTE: THE UNITED STATES TRADE ACT OF
1974.161
It is accepted practice under GATT that some form of tempo-
rary protection be extended as a "safeguard" to prevent the demise
of a domestic industry threatened by imports.' 62 Problems in the
area of safeguards were increased by changes in United States law
under the Trade Act of 1974.163 These changes have made it easier
for an American industry to qualify for safeguard action' l "
A. United States Trade Act of 1974
The Trade Act of 1974 evolved from the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962165 as an effective means of relaxing the criteria for deter-
mining injury to a domestic industry.166 The Trade Act of 1974
extended the powers of the ITC beyond the tariff area. 167 As a re-
sult, relief was no longer tied to tariff action. 168 The Trade Act of
1974 was apparently the result of Congressional concern with the
difficulties facing the United States in the area of international
trade, including payment deficits, fundamental inequities in the
world trading system, and a lack of reciprocity in international eco-
nomic relations. 169 In responding to world economic trends of re-
cent years, particularly those actions taken by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, 170 the Trade Act of 1974 has be-
161. Trade Act, supra note 6. All section references will be to the Trade Act of 1974
unless specified otherwise.
162. CLINE & KAWANABE, supra note 63.
163. Id. at 203.
164. Id.
165. 19 U.S.C. § 1901 (1970).
166. Leonard, supra note 112, at 721.
167. F. V. MEYER supra note 42 at 90. Prior to Trade Act of 1974, domestic industries
injured by a substantial increase in imports almost always obtained relief through tariff ac-
tion. Id.
168. Tariff action has been supplemented by orderly marketing agreements, a form of
import quotas, and by adjustment assistance. Until the passage of the Trade Act of 1974,
these methods had been used sparingly. Under the GAIT, however, relief still remains tied
to tariff action.
169. Minchew, Expanding Role of the United States International Trade Commission, 27
MERCER L. REV. 429, 432. See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON FINANCE, U.S. SEN. TRADE
REFORM ACT of 1974, S. REP. No. 93-1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 15.
170. With respect to the production and pricing mechanisms of Middle East oil reserves.
Vol. 12
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come an extremely useful instrument in effecting domestic adjust-
ment to these trends.
1. Section 201. The Congressional legislation which imple-
mented Article XIX of GATT is section 201171 of the United States
Trade Act of 1974. In instituting section 201, Congress provided a
fair and reasonable test designed to determine whether a domestic
industry was being adversely affected as a result of increased im-
ports. 172 The determination is made by the ITC rather than by re-
lying on ad hoc agreements for individual industries.'
7
The main goal of section 201 is to provide authorization for
the. ITC to conduct investigations that determine whether relief
should be granted to a domestic industry.' 74 The thrust of the in-
vestigation is "to determine whether an article is being imported
into the United States in such increased quantities 75 as to be a sub-
stantial cause 76 of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the do-
mestic industry producing an article similar to or directly
competitive with the imported article."'' 77 The Commission is per-
mitted to recommend import relief in the form of higher tariffs,
tariff quotas, quantitative limits, orderly marketing agreements or
adjustment assistance.
178
The interpretation of section 201 is of serious concern to indus-
tries of other Nations involved in international trade as well as to
those so involved in the United States. The decisions made by the
ITC in the United States will have a substantial world-wide impact
on the way other Nations handle the problem of increased imports
171. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976).
172. 1974 NEWS, supra note 54, at 7203.
173. Id.
174. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1)(1976). Petitions for eligibility for import relief may be filed
by any entity which is representative of an industry, including a trade association, firm, certi-
fied or recognized union, or group of workers. This petition must include a specific state-
ment describing the purposes for which import relief is sought. Under 19 U.S.C.
§ 2251(b)(1), requests for investigation can be made to the I.T.C. by the President, Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations, or upon resolution by either the Committee on Ways
& Means of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Finance of the Senate, or
upon the motion of the I.T.C. Id.
175. Under the Trade Act of 1974, either an absolute increase or an increase relative to
domestic production will satisfy the criterion. The Commission usually examines import
trends over a period of years. See Leonard, supra note 112, at 738.
176. 19 U.S.C. § 225 1(b)(2)(c)(4). A cause which is important and not less than any
other cause.
177. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1).
178. Trade Act, supra note 6, at § 203; see CLINE & KAWANABE, supra note 63, at 203.
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and upon the way these Nations are affected by those decisions.179
In recent years, domestic industries have taken an active interest in
escape clause provisions. Numerous cases before the ITC have
tested the requirements of section 201 and Article XIX.' 80 The cur-
rent problem of increased imports does not appear to be restricted
to the automobile industry. Two leading examples of product areas
affected by the United States safeguard provisions are television
sets and shoes.' 8' The ITC recommended that tariffs on imported
television sets be raised from five per cent to twenty-five per cent,
and that a combination of tariffs and quotas be imposed on shoe
imports. 
82
In 1977, increased importation of Japanese color television sets
was greatly criticized in the United States. During 1976, Japan
shipped approximately three million color television sets to the
United States,'83 representing two and one-half times as many sets
as had been sent the previous year.8 4 The American color televi-
sion industry advocated for protectionist measures and the ITC re-
sponded to these requests in March of 1977.185 The ITC
investigation resulted in a finding that the increase in American im-
ports from Japan was the direct cause of the domestic industry suf-
fering injury. 8 6 The Japanese manufacturers eventually agreed to
limit their color television exports. The administration of section
201 is accomplished by means of a structured set of procedures
which are used by domestic industries to protect themselves from
the potential harm occasioned by increased imports.
179. Id. at 204.
180. Minchew, supra note 169, at 434. See, e.g., U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION, BIRCH PLYWOOD DOOR SKINS: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No.
TA-201-1, PUBLICATION 743 (October 1975); U.S. INERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, CI-
GAR WRAPPER TOBACCO: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-3,
PUBLICATION 744 (November 1975).
181. CLINE & KAWANABE, supra note 63, at 204.
182. Id. The response of President Carter's Administration was to negotiate with Japan
in establishing voluntary export quotas for television imports and with Taiwan and Korea
for shoes. The Administration was aware that if they did not negotiate a voluntary restraint
with Japan, Korea and Taiwan, then Congress would have likely enforced the recommenda-
tions made by the I.T.C. Id.
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B. Procedures and Effects in the Administration of Import Trade
Statutes
In order to affirmatively determine that relief is necessary, sec-
tion 201(b)(1) requires that the domestic industry be seriously in-
jured or threatened by an absolute increase in the number of
imports, and that these imports must be the substantial cause of
that injury. 87 In reaching such a determination, the Commission
should take into account certain economic factors,' 88 including sig-
nificant idling of productive facilities in the industry,' 9 the inabil-
ity of a significant number of firms to operate at a reasonable level
of profit,' 90 and significant employment or under-employment in
the industry.' 9 ' A failure to make an affirmative showing concern-
ing any of the criteria defeats the particular petition that has been
submitted to the ITC.
192
Section 201 also provides procedures for dealing with the ITC
findings. 9 3 Petitions filed by the UAW and Ford were reviewed
during hearings held in October and November of 1980, and the
ITC recommended that no action be taken with respect to automo-
bile imports. If an affirmative finding for relief had been made, the
ITC would then have advised the President as to what type of relief
would have been appropriate.' 94 The President, in his determina-
tion of appropriate measures, is not bound by the ITC recommen-
dation.19 The imposition of any relief measures available to the
President or the ITC would create international legal issues. Prior
to instituting any import restrictions, an importing Nation must
take into account the international legal significance of its actions.
VI. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DOMESTIC
IMPORT RESTRICTIONS
The escape clause provision of the Trade Act of 1974 was cre-
187. 1974 NEWS, supra note 54, at 7264.
188. Id. at 7265.
189. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(A)(1976).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES, supra note 34, at 52.
193. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1976).
194. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(l)(A) and (B)(1976). The I.T.C. shall recommend tariffs, im-
port restrictions or adjustment assistance.
195. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(1976). Five types of relief are available to the U.S. President:
he may (1) impose or increase tariffs, (2) proclaim a tariff or quota system, (3) proclaim
quantitative restrictions, (4) negotiate orderly marketing agreements, or (5) provide relief in
the form of some combination of the above. Id.
23
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ated in order to deal more effectively with the problem of increased
imports. The justification for this type of clause is the necessity to
soften the dislocating impact of more liberal trade by providing
temporary relief so that there could be an adjustment to stronger
competition by industries, firms and individuals. 96 While meeting
the underlying purpose, this rationale for implementing the escape
clause probably fails under the strict criteria of Article XIX. 197 For
example, GATT limits relief measures to imposing or increasing
tariffs whereas section 201 of the Trade Act allows other, more ef-
fective, measures. GATT, however, is binding on all signatory Na-
tions and if the import relief proposed is not within the standards of
GATT, the importing Nation is required to compensate the other
GATT members or it is subject to retaliation.'9"
GATT specifically requires that if a member makes an affirm-
ative determination, any restriction imposed by that Nation must
be observed by all nations which export that product.' 99 This obli-
gation is referred to as the MFN clause and prohibits a nation from
restricting imports from one Nation while imposing no restrictions
on the same import from other Nations.2°
Article XIX entitles a GATT member exporting Nation to be
compensated by eliciting an equivalent concession or compensatory
concessions from the Nation invoking the escape clause.20 1 These
compensation measures could be avoided through bilateral agree-
ments, such as an OMA, negotiated between the Nations in-
volved.2 °2 The United States could also avoid granting
compensatory concessions or facing foreign retaliation where the
appropriate remedy may be under American law for which no
compensation or rehabilitation may be in order.20 3 The imposition
of particular types of restrictions, however, would be in direct vio-
lation of GATT terms and could result in international trade
conflicts.
196. Budott, Jovits, Lavet, Imports, Exports and Related Matters - International Trade
Commission, 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 33 (1978).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. GATT, supra note 3, art. 1, 4 BISD.
200. According to the MFN clause of GATT, any restriction of imports by one member
nation must apply to all nations who export the same product to that nation. If only one
nation is identified with respect to the restriction, then the restriction would appear to consti-
tute an action discriminatory in favor of one MFN nation and against other MFN nations.
201. Easton, supra note 52, at 67.
202. Id.
203. 1974 NEWS, supra note 54, at 7266, 7267.
Vol. 12
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A. Consequences of Imposing Certain Types of Import
Restrictions
1. Quantitative Restraints. The imposition of quantitative re-
straints would constitute a violation of GATT, and therefore a vio-
lation of international trade obligations. 2" Parties to GATT are
bound by agreement in Article II, paragraph 1, not to institute
"prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses, or other measures. "205 In the United States, for example,
an attempt by Congress to impose quantitative restrictions206 would
tend to nullify and impair previous American trade concessions in
the automobile sector.20 7 The effect on domestic trade concessions
would be to give trading partners, such as Japan, justification under
GATT °8 to suspend substantially equivalent concessions. The sus-
pension of concessions would, under international law, legally enti-
tle trading partners to use retaliatory measures which might result
in an unpredictable and complicated trade war. 0 9 The imposition
of quantitative restrictions is inconsistent with international obliga-
tions under GATT.210 In effect, GATT would be violated for the
sole purpose of helping a domestic industry secure a greater part of
the world market.
2. Domestic Content Regulations. The imposition of domestic
content laws would also constitute a violation of GATT.
211 Impos-
ing content laws amounts to the use of a nations's legal system to
protect its industry at the expense of the foreign industry.21 2 A do-
mestic law requiring manufacturers to use certain quantities of do-
mestic components in the manufacturing process would be a
violation of the international obligations of GATT.2 13
GATT obligations are taken seriously by the member Nations.
Commitments are expected from all trading partners, and those
204. GATT, supra note 3, art. XI, 4 BISD.
205. Id. art. II, 4 BISD.
206. See H.R. 6492.
207. 1980 TRADE HEARINGS, supra note 15, at 124. (Statement of the American Im-
ported Automobile Dealers Association.) The Japanese have no quotas per se on U.S. ex-
ports to Japan, but could retaliate by imposing quotas on United States exports to Japan. ld.
208. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIII (2), 4 BISD.




213. GATT, supra note 3, art. III, par. 5, 4 BISD.
25
Weinberg: Imposing Import Restrictions Under Escape Clause Provisions: A Ca
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
same Nations expect equal commitments from their trading part-
ners. There appears to be little doubt that restrictions on the im-
portation of automobiles, whether by quota or domestic content
regulation, are inconsistent with GATT obligations.2"4
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the end of World War II, there has been a significant
increase in the volume and liberalization of international trade. At
times, serious adjustment problems and inequities have resulted
from the differential effects of international trade flows. Manufac-
turers and workers within inefficient and import-competing indus-
tries must often bear some of the costs of aggregate long-term
national gains. These conditions often give rise to strong political
pressures for protectionism.
Current trade policies with regard to the automobile industry,
in North America and within the EEC, reflect an underlying sense
of crisis. The trade problems associated with the automobile indus-
try appear to have strained the capacity of existing international
arrangements to meet national needs, and protectionist forces in
many Nations are clamoring for protection of their automobile in-
dustries from increased imports. Although the United States Gov-
ernment has pursued liberalized trade practices and avoided
protectionist measures in the past, it cannot ignore employee layoffs
and the decline of domestic sales. These conditions have generally
resulted from the flood of Japanese imported automobiles into the
American market.
The openness of trade policies in such nations as Great Brit-
ain, West Germany and the United States has aroused protectionist
factions in their respective nations. The most viable legal basis for
imposing restrictive measures under international law is the escape
clause or safeguards provision found in GATT. Article XIX, in
particular, allows an importing Nation to temporarily suspend obli-
gations and withdraw or modify trade concessions if increased im-
ports cause or threaten to cause injury to the domestic industry.215
This avenue, however, has been for those Nations subject to in-
creased imports of automobiles. GATT creates too many loopholes
which provide methods for avoiding rules, 216 resulting in the crea-
214. 1980 TRADE HEARINGS, supra note 4, at 125.
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tion of more acceptable and effective safeguards by individual
Nations.
A prime example is section 201 of the United States Trade Act
of 1974. Pursuant to procedures of the Act, the ITC determined
that increased imports were not the sole cause of injury to the
United States automobile industry.217 This determination, how-
ever, is only a recommendation and the President may choose to
impose restrictive measures on his own. If he should decide to im-
pose restrictions, pursuant to section 201, and other than those pro-
vided for in GATT, it could spark negotiations on the applicability
of GATT's present safeguards provision and whether passage of a
new Safeguards Code is imperative.
GATT was originally intended to permit only tariffs as restric-
tions on trade, but this policy has not succeeded.218 It is now neces-
sary to recognize the use of quantitative restraints, orderly
marketing agreements and other non-tariff barriers in order to reg-
ulate their use.219 As a result, the safeguards provision of GATT
must be substantially revised 22° so that it can be used as a vehicle in
supervising international trade among the contracting parties.
Despite the ITC decision and the refusal of the United States
to invoke Article XIX or institute restrictions, the automobile im-
port problem may eventually be solved. The internationalization
of the industry and the introduction of the "world car" have tended
to circumvent the problems occasioned by increased imports. The
necessity to impose restrictions or invoke safeguards may be unnec-
essary if the production of the "world car" is successful. On the
other hand, the automobile manufacturers may still desire the use
of safeguards provisions to temporarily relieve their industries from





220. Id. See generally POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 65, at vii, viii. The Safeguards
Code Should allow for the creation of conditions by governments that would allow the pri-
vate sector to undertake adjustments and innovations in order to avoid trade restrictions for
any extended period in any industrial sector. Furthermore, industry and government must
be committed to make the necessary adjustment within a reasonable period of time. This
international code should be composed of clear rules prescribing when restrictions against
imports can be imposed, how long they should last, and what forms they should take. Id.
27
Weinberg: Imposing Import Restrictions Under Escape Clause Provisions: A Ca
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
